Hybrid warfare will be the most likely type of conflict the US and its allies will face in the future. Hybrid warfare is the use of conventional and unconventional ways and means-by any combination of state and non-state actors-within the same battlespace. Conventional and unconventional ways and means include forces, weapons and tactics, and are characterized by the use of modern technology and a high degree of unity of effort between regular and irregular forces.
Introduction
The dispute between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions in Ukraine led to revolution and civil war in 2014. Russia Moreover, Russia's methods are sure to be emulated by other adversaries who seek to offset western conventional military superiority. For these reasons, hybrid warfare is a topic of strategic importance.
In the future, hybrid warfare will be the most likely type of conflict the US and its allies will face as a result of the convergence of several geopolitical drivers. These include, the transformation of traditional governing structures, disputes over political power caused by longstanding cultural differences, and state sponsorship of insurgencies. In this paper, I define hybrid warfare in detail, argue why it will be the most likely type of conflict the US and its allies will encounter, and lay out a strategic framework for deterring and defeating these hybrid threats.
Defining Hybrid Warfare
The concept of hybrid war is closely related to military theorist William Lind's concept of Fourth Generation Warfare. 3 Lind traces the evolution of the modern war from the Peace of 
Why Hybrid Warfare Will be the Most Likely Form of Future Conflict
Hybrid warfare will be the most likely type of conflict the US and its allies will encounter in the future as a result of several geopolitical drivers. These include, the transformation of traditional governing structures, disputes over political power caused by longstanding cultural differences and state sponsorship of insurgencies and revolutions. Economic factors may also contribute, as there is a strong historical correlation between widespread economic hardship and political instability. The ensuing struggles will lead to insurgencies and civil wars in weak and failing states. Traditional security interests will lead to state sponsorship of internal conflicts as states choose sides in these struggles for power. The wars that result will be characterized by conventional and unconventional ways and means, producing hybrid war.
Our own security interests and the interests of our allies will draw us into these wars, as we seek to maintain international order and prevent the spillover effects of war, such as international terrorism and the mass flow of refugees. The conflict in Ukraine is partially explained by the centuries-old struggle between Russia and the west.
In addition to cultural drivers such as historical grievances, religion and ideology, traditional state security interests will also lead to the outbreak of hybrid wars. Putin's intervention in Ukraine is driven by a confluence of cultural factors and his desire for a security buffer zone between Russia and NATO. 17 Security interests and culture also intersect in the ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq. All of the major regional actors-Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia-have complex security and cultural reasons that influence their participation in the conflict.
As states provide non-state actors with financial backing, modern weapons and welltrained forces, hybrid wars will become increasingly complex. As a result, hybrid war will take on the characteristics of a low-level insurgency and a modern conventional war. In Ukraine, the rebel use of radar guided surface-to-air missiles, MANPADs (man-portable air-defense systems)
and anti-aircraft artillery-presumably supplied by Russia 18 -has resulted in the shoot down of twenty Ukrainian military fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, in addition to Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17.
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Hybrid warfare will also use modern information technology-such as cell phones and social media-for the purposes of connecting and organizing large groups to support a political cause and for battlefield command and control. The Arab Spring is one example. In the future, we will most likely witness the increasingly sophisticated use of cyber warfare in order to disrupt or destroy state industrial, financial and military networks. We have already seen the Russians conduct cyber attacks in Georgia and Estonia. 20 During hybrid war, all of the geopolitical drivers and factors discussed above will merge, making the hybrid battlespace increasingly more complex. The Hybrid Warfare Framework I offer in the next section is designed to address each of these actors and drivers in parallel in order to prevent hybrid conflict from occurring-or if necessary, bring about conflict termination and resolution after a hybrid war begins.
Deterring and Defeating Hybrid Adversaries
The strategic framework for preventing hybrid wars and deterring/defeating hybrid adversaries is based on two pillars, as seen in Figure 2 above. The first pillar consists of actions to assist and support weak or failing states. The actions in this pillar focus on the prevention and resolution of hybrid wars through intelligence collection and thoughtful analysis about the actors and drivers of potential conflict; use of diplomacy to reform government and build international coalitions; use of information operations to discourage support for insurgent groups and encourage governmental reforms; use of economic assistance in order to support government services and the population; and military security cooperation activities to maintain internal security and protect borders. Each of these actions should be directed toward the key actors and dominant drivers of each particular conflict, and they should be applied simultaneously.
Furthermore, these actions must also continue to be applied once hybrid conflict breaks out.
The second pillar consists of actions directed toward the hybrid adversary, which will most likely be a combination of a non-state actor and an internationally recognized state actor.
These actions will focus on deterring state sponsors from fueling hybrid conflict, or defeating the hybrid adversary once a war has begun. They include: collecting and analyzing intelligence about the forces driving the hybrid war and the actors who are participating in it-to include their motives, strategy and tactics; conducting diplomatic negotiations with all parties and building international support for our objectives; conducting information operations on a strategic scale to expose the state's sponsorship of insurgent, terrorist or revolutionary groups and any war crimes or atrocities being committed by the hybrid opponents and building support for the US/coalition cause; imposing economic and financial sanctions on state sponsors and freezing the funds of non-state actors; and building a military force to deter-and if necessary decisively defeat-the hybrid adversary within the hybrid battlespace. These actions fall more in line with traditional strategic and operational planning; however, they will need to be modified to address hybrid war.
One of the lessons observed from the study of hybrid conflicts is the requirement to be able to simultaneously counter conventional and unconventional threats. We should re-address the current method of operational planning that divides conflicts into shaping, seizing the initiative, decisive action, and transition to civil authority phases. Because hybrid wars concurrently take on characteristics of both conventional and unconventional conflict, our plans will have to adjust as well. Conventional and unconventional military actions, such as targeting military supply routes and protecting the population, must occur at the same time. They will not occur in series-as is typical of traditional planning, with stability and transition to civilauthority operations occurring after major conflict ends. 21 Figure 3 (see below) shows how these pillars cut-across all of the actors and drivers involved in a hybrid conflict.
Intelligence analysis is a key component of both pillars of the framework. The US must continue to develop our intelligence capabilities so we may better understand the cultural and political factors that drive non-state and state actors to resort to violence. We should devote more resources not only to intelligence collection, but also to thoughtful and varied analysisespecially with regard to understanding the drivers and locations of potential conflict. If indications of future conflict can be identified early, then the US and its allies can target resources toward the areas that may prevent conflict from erupting and spreading. This is particularly critical in the areas of the globe that our political leaders believe represent a threat to our vital interests or to the international order. Analysis will identify which drivers are most important and the likelihood of political conflict becoming violent. The fact we were caught offguard by the Arab Spring and the rapid rise of the Islamic State supports this claim. We should rely not only on US analysis, but also on the analysis of other states and non-governmental organizations. Approaching the analysis from different paradigms is likely to lead to a more accurate perspective.
As we identify areas of potential or ongoing conflict, we will need to use our diplomatic, informational, economic and military sources of power to keep these conflicts from erupting into full-scale hybrid wars or resolving them after they have already begun. As with intelligence collection and analysis, all of these elements should target the drivers of conflict and be modified according to the context of each particular situation. Diplomacy should be used to resolve internal and external political conflict through peaceful means. Information operations should be used to effectively shape the domestic and international political environment and to encourage peaceful resolution. Economic assistance should attempt to support government infrastructure and services, and economic sanctions should target state sponsors and non-state financial assets.
In the first pillar, military power should be used for security cooperation, foreign internal defense and border security; however, it should be used thoughtfully-and not for the purpose of suppressing minority factions.
Under this paradigm, military security cooperation must be done with an eye toward the cultural and political drivers of conflict, and be careful not to exacerbate them. In the past, foreign aid, to include arms sales, has often led to the suppression of minority voices-despite the best intentions of our military and State Department leaders. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine offers a good model for demonstrating how the above framework should be employed. The US and its allies should take the following actions toward Ukraine: intelligence collection and analysis in order to understand the dynamics of the internal security situation in Ukraine; diplomacy to enact cease-fires; information operations to build support internally for just government; economic assistance to help the Ukrainian people and stabilize the government; and security cooperation-to include arms sales-to ensure the Ukrainians can properly defend their borders and maintain internal security.
Additionally, the US and its allies should take the following actions toward Russia and the hybrid rebel force fighting inside Ukraine: intelligence collection and analysis to ascertain Russia's strategy and desired end state; diplomacy to shore up international support for Russian sanctions and bring about a diplomatic solution to the crisis; informational power-through the use of all media-to reveal the truth behind Russia's furtive involvement; economic sanctions to pressure the Russian economy; 23 and military power to build a force that will deter future aggression. This force should be a combination of NATO's planned reaction force and a division size US ground force-augmented by NATO air, space, cyber and special operations forces.
In December 2014, NATO announced the decision to create a brigade-size "interim spearhead force" comprised of German, Dutch and Norwegian troops and capable of rapidly deploying to potentially troubled regions by January 2015. 24 The NATO reaction force will be built to deploy on very short notice. It will serve as a "test bed" for a larger permanent force that is scheduled to deploy in 2016. NATO states the force has the "overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defense purposes or for other crisis-response operations." 25 The response force will contain naval, air, land and special operations forces. The nations who contribute to the force will rotate. Most importantly, the force "will be tailored (adjusted in size and capability) to match the demands of any specific operation to which it is committed."
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As it designs its reaction force, NATO should heed the lessons of previous hybrid wars. Another consideration for the response force is determining the political will of all the nations who plan to contribute to it. Some scholars have warned about the potential political shortcomings of the NATO force. Heidi Hardt writes, "Time and again, policymakers have debated the idea of rapid-reaction forces. Practitioners recognize that delays cost lives. Yet of those international organizations that have invested in rapid-reaction forces, none have followed through with deployment. Political will has both prevented the deployment of rapid-reaction forces and slowed the establishment of broader peacekeeping operations. After decades of attempts, the United Nations failed to establish a rapid-reaction force." 32 In order for the NATO reaction force to be an effective deterrent, all of the nations will have to be prepared to act jointly and rapidly.
Given the state of current European military forces, the reaction force will need to be augmented by a sizeable US force in order to deter future aggression in Eastern Europe. This will most likely require forward deploying a division size force of approximately 10,000 troops to Eastern Europe, while diplomatically signaling to Russia the defensive nature of the movement. 
Conclusion and Additional Recommendations
Hybrid war will be the most likely conflict the US will face in the future. The transformation of traditional governing structures will reveal deep-rooted cultural and ideological differences, and subsequently lead to violent struggles for political power in weak and failing states. Additionally, traditional security interests will lead to the state sponsorship of insurgencies through financial backing and the proliferation of modern weapons of war. The wars that result will be characterized by both conventional and unconventional ways and means.
The US must remember the historical and cultural lessons it learned from its counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and at the same time prepare to face a far more technologically and operationally sophisticated enemy. Future conflicts may deny US forces the freedom of movement they have enjoyed in the last two conflicts. The potential combination of Improvised Explosive Devices, electronic and cyber warfare, anti-armor weapons, long-range rockets, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons will make a future hybrid conflict extremely challenging.
In the past, terms like Full Spectrum Operations implied the US must be prepared to conduct all types of operations-from peacekeeping missions and low-intensity conflict on one end of the spectrum, to conventional war on the other. In hybrid war, all of the characteristics of Full Spectrum Operations may appear in the same battlespace and at the same time.
The framework I propose for deterring and defeating hybrid conflicts relies heavily on intelligence collection and analysis in order to understand the actors involved in hybrid conflict and the forces driving them toward violence. Moreover, it makes coordinated and parallel use of David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power in order prevent hybrid conflicts from occurring, deter state sponsors and resolve these conflicts after they begin.
The military component of both pillars of my framework must occur in parallel with the other instruments of power, whether being used to deter aggression, dissuade insurgent activities, or defeat a hybrid adversary in a full-scale hybrid war.
Potential hybrid threats will require us to re-evaluate the debate over future US force structure, which currently pits the proponents of a low-tech-and manpower intensive-counterinsurgency force against the proponents of a force built to wage modern conventional war. An enemy who possesses the mixture of high-tech weaponry and unconventional ways and means will present a dangerous challenge to US planners as they seek to develop a military strategy to counter such threats. We should continue to modernize our forces for both conventional and unconventional wars with the appropriate mix of sophistication, quality, quantity, and flexibility.
Finally, we need to build a flexible, adaptable and mobile force that can rapidly respond to crises around the globe. The French summed it up as "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." In this type of warfare, "obedience" is the most important aspect of military culture. Lind argues this type of war is the "American way of war," with aviation replacing artillery as the primary source of "firepower."
The Third Generation of Modern Warfare, developed by the Germans, is most commonly known as "Blitzkrieg" or "maneuver warfare." Its defining characteristics are "speed," "surprise," and "mental and physical dislocation." Consequently, it demands that its practitioners possess "initiative" rather than unquestioned "obedience." 5 Ibid., 12-14. 6 See Mansoor, "Hybrid Warfare in History," 1-17. Although Frank Hoffman's definition of hybrid war remains the most frequently cited, other scholars take a broader view. Retired US Army Colonel and Ohio State University Professor of History Dr. Pete Mansoor writes, "although there is little new in hybrid war as a concept, it is a useful means of thinking about war's past, present, and future." For Mansoor, hybrid war has more to do with the way "forces engage" in war, than the "nature" of war itself. Mansoor argues that a hybrid war involves "a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose." When viewed from this broader perspective, a multitude of conflicts-from the Peloponnesian Wars, to the Boer War, to the French and American wars in Vietnam-become hybrid. In order to be successful in hybrid warfare, Mansoor argues political and military leaders must: (1) "understand the nature of their opponent," (2) "adjust existing doctrine to take into account the kind of war in which their forces engage," and (3) "create viable operational concepts that link strategy to tactical actions." Hoffman would refer to the type of conflict Mansoor describes as "compound war." See Hoffman's "Hybrid vs. compound war-The Janus choice -Defining today's multifaceted conflict." I believe the increasingly dominant role of nonstate actors, combined with the powerful effects of modern weapons and information technology, support Hoffman's assertion that hybrid warfare is distinct from the compound wars we have seen in the past, although it is truly by a matter of degree. Nonetheless, both definitions have substantial merit-the focus for leaders and strategists should be on understanding the unique nature of each conflict rather than arguing over semantics. 
